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his article covers develop­
ments from the past year af­
fecting taxation of individuals, in­
cluding last year's tax relief, health 
care, and small business leg isla­
tion, regu lations, cases, and IRS 
guidance. The items are arranged 
in Code section order. 
Sec. 32: Earned Income 
Erroneous EITC payments: In Octo­
ber 2011., the IRS issued proposed regula­
tions that would require return preparers 
to submit to the IRS documentation of 
taxpayers' eligibility for the earned in­
come tax credit (EITC). 1 The proposed 
regulations, under the Sec. 6695(g) pre­
parer due diligence provisions, would 
require preparers to submit Form 8897, 
Paid Preparer's Earned Income Credit 
Checklist, to the IRS. Currently, return 
preparers are required only to keep the 
form or the information it requires in 
their records. The proposed regulations 
also would subject preparers' firms to the 
same penalty for a lack of due diligence 
concerning EITC claims. Firms, however, 
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could not claim the defense available to 
preparers-that their office's EITC due 
diligence procedures are reasonably de ­
signed and routinely followed and that 
the failure was isolated and inadvertent. 
The proposed regulations would be effec­
tive when finalized, for tax years ending 
on or after December 31, 2011. 
Also in October, Congress increased 
the Sec. 6695(g) preparer penalty for fail­
ing to exercise due diligence with respect 
to an EITC claim from $100 to $500 per 
failure for returns required to be filed 
after December 31, 2011. The provision 
was included in a free-trade agreement 
with South Korea.2 
1 REG-140280-09. 

2 The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 2011, P.L. 112-4, §501. 
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Earlier in 2011, a Treasury Inspector 
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) 
report3 revealed that, despite improvements 
in the IRS's ability to detect them, in fiscal 
2009 the IRS continued to pay out between 
$11 billion and $13 billion in erroneous 
EITC payments. The TIGTA report noted 
that the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) had listed improper EITCs as the 
second-highest dollar amount of improper 
payments of all federal programs. TIGTA 
also noted that the IRS estimates that 
23%-28% ofEITC payments continue to 
be erroneous, showing little improvement 
since the 2002 inception of reporting esti­
mates to Congress. The report summarizes 
IRS attempts to improve compliance and 
reduce fraud as well as TIGTA recommen­
dations to do the same. In April2011, the 
GAO reported4 that erroneously claimed 
EITCs for fiscal 2010 were estimated at 
$16.9 million, jumping almost 38% from 
fiscal2009. 
EITC retention in bankruptcy: A 
bankruptcy court5 approved a couple's 
chapter 13 plan, stating that, absent un­
usual circumstances, debtors receiving 
the EITC or the Sec. 24(d) additional 
child tax credit (ACTC) or both may 
retain $2,000 of their tax refunds-the 
combination of the $1,000 refund the 
same court had determined in In re Leigh6 
and up to $1,000 of EITC or ACTC. 
However, if either the EITC or the ACTC 
or both total less than $1,000, the maxi­
mum the debtors may retain is the $1,000 
available to all debtors and the amount of 
their EITC or ACTC, the court held. 
Sec. 36: First-Time Homebuyer 
Credit 
The first-time homebuyer credit expired 
in 2010 (eligible home purchasers must 
have entered into a written binding con­
tract before May 1, 2010, and the pur­
chase must have closed on or before Sep­
tember 30, 2010), but it continues to be a 
subject of litigation and IRS guidance. 
Purchase from relative: In Nievinski,? 
the Tax Court held that an individual who 
had purchased a home from his parents did 
not qualify for the first-time homebuyer 
credit. The taxpayer had taken the credit 
based on his accountant's directions and 
the fact that Form 5405, First-Time Home­
buyer Credit and Repayment of the Credit, 
did not clearly prohibit buying a home from 
relatives. In court, the taxpayer further ar­
gued that IRS Publication 4819, Important 
Information About the First-Time Home­
buyer Credit, did not expressly explain that 
home purchases from family members do 
not qualify for the credit. 
The court held that Form 5405 and 
Publication 4819 provide general instruc­
tions and do not purport to provide all rules 
and limitations applicable to the credit. The 
apparent failure of some IRS publications 
to explain the limitation has no effect on 
the authority of Sec. 36(c), the court held. 
Sec. 36(c)(3) clearly states that the credit is 
not available to a taxpayer who purchases a 
home from a related person, and Sec. 36(c) 
(5) clarifies that related persons include di­
rect ancestors such as parents. 
Principal residence: In a chief counsel 
advice ( CCA)8 the IRS allowed the credit to 
a taxpayer who had lived partly in a stor­
age shed on the construction site of his new 
home. The taxpayer's previous residence 
on the site had been destroyed by fire more 
than three years earlier. In late 2008, the 
taxpayer began constructing a new home 
on the same property and lived 40% of the 
time in a storage shedidwelling unit on the 
property. The storage shed had a stove, re­
frigerator, bathroom, sleeping apparatus, 
and heat. The taxpayer lived the rest of the 
time with his girlfriend. The Chief Coun­
sel's Office was asked whether the taxpayer 
met the first-time home buyer credit require­
ment that the taxpayer not have owned a 
principal residence in the three-year period 
before purchasing the home for which the 
credit is claimed. 
The Chief Counsel's Office ruled that 
the storage shed/dwelling unit was a resi­
dence for purposes of Sec. 121. because 
under Regs. Sec. 1.121-l(e)(2), the term 





• 	Several actions by Congress 
and the IRS aimed to reduce 
improper claims of the 
earned income tax credit by 
increasing preparer penalties 
and due diligence procedures. 
• Litigation over restricted 
stock-based comp!3nsation 
focused on the proper date of 
the stock's market valuation 
and the effect of company and 
SEC restrictions on disposition 
of the stock. 
• 	The Tax Court applied 
the IRS's recent practice 
of allowing professional 
gamblers to deductordinary 
and reasonable nonwagering 
business expenses over their 
gambling winnings, overturning 
a1951 case holding. 
• 	The Tax Court also held that 
limited partners of alimited 
partnership who perform 
services for the partnership in 
their capacity as partners may 
be liable for self-employment 
taxes despite ageneral 
statutory exemption from self­
employment income for limited 
, . 
partners mcome. 
as in Sec. 280A(f)(1). Under Regs. Sec. 
1.280A-1, a dwelling unit could be a 
house, apartment, condominium, mobile 
home, boat, or similar property that pro­
vides basic living accommodations such as 
3 	 TIGTA, Reduction Targets and Strategies Have Not Been Established to 5 In re Skougard, 438 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010). 
Reduce the Billions of Dollars in Improper Earned Income Tax Credit Pay­ 6 In re Leigh, No. 03-33764 (Bankr. D. Utah 4/27/04). 
ments Each Year, Report No. 2011-40-023 (February 7, 2011). 7 Nievinski, T.C. Summ. 2011-10. 
4 	 Daly, Impmper Payments: Recent Efforts to Add1·ess Improper Payments 8 CCA 201104037 (1/28/11 ). 
and Remaining Challenges, GA0-11-575T (April15, 2011). 
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sleeping space, toilet, and cooking facili­
ties. However, the unit was not considered 
the taxpayer's principal residence because 
the taxpayer did not spend the majority 
of his time there as required by Regs. Sec. 
1.121-1 (b). Therefore, the taxpayer met 
the definition of a first-time homebuyer 
because he had not owned a principal resi­
dence within the three years prior to the 
date of purchase of the new home (in this 
case, the occupancy date). The taxpayer 
could include only the cost of constructing 
the new home in calculating the credit. 
Longtime resident credit: In CCA 
201104040,9 the IRS wrote that a tax­
payer who completed construction of and 
occupied a new home on land that was the 
site of the taxpayer's previous home that 
had been owned and used for the required 
time10 could qualify for the $6,500 maxi­
mum credit as a longtime resident. The 
taxpayer would not include any basis in 
the land as part of the purchase price of 
the new home because the land purchase 
was not near enough in time to the con­
struction of the new home. 
TIGTA report: In March 2011, TIGTA 
issued its final audit report11 on the home­
buyer credit and other refundable credits. 
The report includes estimates of fraudu ­
lently filed returns, TIGTA's recommenda­
tions to the IRS in each problem area, and 
the IRS response to each. Implementation 
of the recommendations should reduce 
fraud related to credits promulgated in 
more recent legislation. 
Sec. 53: Credit for Prior-Year 
Minimum Tax Liability 
The IRS Office of Chief Counsel was asked 
whether restrictions on the computation 
of regular taxes owed by recipients of Sec. 
965 dividends also apply for purposes of 
computing the minimum tax credit under 
Sec. 53.12 Specifically, the taxpayer was 
interested in whether the floor on taxable 
income under Sec. 965(e)(2)(A) precludes 
the reduction of alternative minimum tax­
able income (AMTI) below the amount of 
nondeductible dividends for purposes of 
computing the limit on minimum tax cred­
its under Sec. 53( c). 
The chief counsel stated that Sec. 
965(e)(2)(A) unambiguously precludes 
the reduction of taxable income below the 
amount of nondeductible dividends and 
that AMTI is derived from regular tax­
able income. Further, Sec. 55(b)(2) defines 
AMTI as taxable income modified only 
under Sees. 56-58, and nothing in those 
sections provides for eliminating nonde­
ductible Sec. 965 dividends. 
Sec. 61: Gross Income Defined 

General welfare exclusion: Notice 
2011-14 13 provides guidance on the non­
taxability of certain payments made to or 
on behalf of certain individual homeown­
ers by state housing finance agencies or 
the federal Department of Housing and 
Urban Development's Emergency Home­
owners' Loan Program. Such payments 
may be nontaxable under the general wel­
fare exclusion because they are intended 
to help financially distressed individuals. 
The notice's guidance includes a safe har­
bor for affected individuals who deduct 
mortgage interest and lists various types 
of financial relief programs it covers. 
Taxation ofemployee annuities: Rev. 
Rul. 2011-714 discusses four scenarios in 
which a defined contribution plan is ter­
minated with certain distributions made 
to participants or beneficiaries. The ruling 
explains the tax treatment of the termina­
tion action and whether the distributions 
are subject to tax. 
Sec. 83: Property Transferred in 
Connection with Performance 
of Services 
Two recent court cases dealt with stock­
based compensation paid to corporate 
officers and when and how the stock 
should be valued. In Gudmundsson, 15 
on July 1, 1999, the taxpayer received as 
an officer of his employer a grant of re­
stricted stock of the employer corporation 
subject to a one-year holding period. Based 
on the stock's market price on the day the 
taxpayer received approximately 73,000 
shares, his Form W-2, Wage and Tax State­
ment, reported the value at just under 
$1.3 million. Gudmundsson reported this 
amount on his 1999 tax return. By the 
end of 1999, the stock price had dropped 
by almost half, and by the one-year anni­
versary of his receiving the stock, when it 
became freely marketable, the price had 
dropped by $14 per share to a little more 
than one-fifth its original value. 
In 2003, Gudmundsson filed an 
amended return for 1999 modifying his 
income based on a stock price for De­
cember 31, 1999, rather than the date he 
received the stock. The IRS and a district 
court denied his refund, and Gudmunds­
son appealed to the Second Circuit. 
As he had in district court, Gudmunds­
son argued that the shares were not tax­
able when received due to various Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
company restrictions on their transferabil­
ity. The Second Circuit disagreed, noting 
that prior rulings have held that potential 
legal liability under Section 1 O(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act for transferring 
stock subject to such restrictions does not 
create a substantial risk of forfeiture for 
Sec. 83 purposes. In addition, the restric­
tions on transferability were not absolute. 
For example, transfers to certain persons, 
such as fami ly members, were allowed. 
Also, if property can be pledged or as­
signed, it may be considered transferable 
under Regs. Sec. 1.83-3(d), the court said. 
Gudmundsson also argued that the 
district court had incorrectly determined 
the stock's fair market value (FMV). The 
Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the 
restrictions did not affect FMV for Sec. 
83 purposes. The court noted that lapse 
restrictions imposed by contract or opera­
tion of law are disregarded in measuring 
income under Sec. 83. 
In Strom,16 the taxpayer received stock 
options in 1998 exercisable on future dates 
9 CCA 201104040 (1/28/11). 12 CCA 201115019 (4/15/11). 
10 Any consecutive five-year period during the eight-year period ending on the 13 Notice 2011 -14, 2011 -1 I.R.B. 544. 
date of the purchase of a subsequent principal residence (Sec. 36(c)(6)). 14 Rev. Rul. 2011 -7,2011-10 I.R.B . .534. 
11 	 TIGTA, Recovery Act: Administration of the First-Time Homebuyer Credit 15 Gudmundsson, 634 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2011}. 
Indicates a Need for Improved Controls over Refundable Credits, Report 16 Strom, 641 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2011). 
No. 2011-41-035 (March 31, 2011). 
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at $15 per share. She began exercising 
them late in 1999 and continued doing so 
during early 2000, when the stock market 
value exceeded $1,000 per share. How­
ever, the value dropped to between $55 and 
$64 throughout part of early 2001. Strom 
argued that her option spreads for 2000 
should be based on the 2001 prices rather 
than actuaJ spreads in 2000. For op6ons 
Strom exercised in 1999, her employer 
withheld both income and Medicare taxes. 
For the 2000 options, the employer with­
held only Medicare tax. Strom did not re­
port the spread on the 2000 options on her 
tax return. She sought refunds of the taxes 
withheld in 1999 and 2000. 
Sec. 83(c)(3) provides a special rule to 
defer recognition and valuatjon of income 
when a person could be subject to suit 
under SEC Section 16(b), which forbids 
corporate insiders from profiting by selling 
the corporation's stock within six months 
of purchasing it. In such a case, the person's 
rights in the property are considered subject 
to a substantial risk of forfeiture and not 
transferable. At issue in the case was the 
meaning of "could subject a person to suit 
under Section 16(b)" as used in Sec. 83(c) 
(3 ). The Ninth Circuit reviewed the pur­
pose of this subsection and concluded that 
a taxpayer could defer calculating and rec­
ognizing the income 
if there is an objectively reasonable 
chance that a suit under §16(b) based on 
a sale ofher stock would have succeeded. 
That st~mdard roughly equates to a de­
termination of whether a reasonably 
prudent and legally sophisticated person 
would not have sold her stock, because, 
if a §16(b) suit had been brought against 
her, she likely would have been forced 
to forfeit the profit obtained by the sale 
(or, at a minimum, she would have faced 
substantial legal expenses defending 
herself against a claim not readily dis­
missed). [Emphasis in original.) 
After analyzing the relevant SEC provisions, 
thecourtconcluded thatStrom did not meet 
the requirements of the Sec. 83(c)(3) rule. 
Next, the court analyzed whether 
Regs. Sec. 1.83-3(k) allowed Strom to 
defer reporting her option income. This 
provision applies when property rights 
are subject to a restriction on transfer to .. 
comply with the pooling-of-interests rules 
of SEC Accounting Series Releases 130 
and 135. The court remanded the case 
to the district court for a ruling based on 
further factual analysis. 
Sec. 104: Compensation for 
Injuries or Sickness 
In Bakken,17 a police officer sustained 
an injury in the line of duty that made 
him permanently disabled and unable to 
work. He was in a plan in which officers 
could retire after 20 years of service once 
they had reached age 50. At the time of 
the injury, Bakken was in his mid-40s and 
had completed 18lh years of service and 
therefore was not eligible to retire. He began 
receiving tax-exempt disability benefits 
under the same plan and did not return to 
work. When Bakken turned 50, the payer of 
the disability benefits started issuing Form 
1099-R for the payments, on the premise 
that they were now retirement benefits. 
Bakken protested, noting that he did not yet 
meet the retirement eligibility requirements. 
He reported the 1099-R income on his 
income tax returns but later filed amended 
returns obtaining a refund and thereafter 
no longer reported the 1099-R income. The 
IRS determined a tax deficiency. 
The Tax Court examined the state law 
relevant to the payments and cases with 
similar facts. The court followed Picard,18 in 
which the Ninth Circuit (to which Bakken 
could have appealed had he not petitioned 
as an S case) had stated that payments were 
for disability rather than retirement when 
the benefits could not be determined by 
reference to the taxpayer's age or length of 
service. The court held for the taxpayer. 
Sec. 108: Income from 
Discharge of Indebtedness­
Exclusions 
In CCA 201104032,19 the IRS deter­
mined that payments received by health 
care professionals under a state's tuition 
reimbursement and recruitment incentive 
programs were not excludible from gross 
income under Sec. 108(f) as student loan 
discharges. The two programs in question 
did not meet the requirement of having 
outstanding student debt to participate. In 
addition, the participants could spend their 
payments as they wished. The IRS noted 
that, if the programs were modified, future 
payments could potentially qualify. 
The Office of Chief Counsel also is­
sued guidance on new Sec. 108(f)(4),20 
which was added by the Patient Protec­
tion and Affordable Care Act,21 to ex­. 
elude from income discharge of indebt­
edness under certain state and federal 
programs intended to increase the avail ­
ability of health care in underserved 
areas. It covers both loan forgiveness and 
loan repayment and requires both em­
ployers and employees to coordinate with 
each other to ensure that duplicate refund 
claims are not filed and double refunds 
are not paid when following procedures 
to claim FICA refunds. 
Sec. 112: Excludible Combat 
Zone Compensation 
The Tax Court held that income a tax­
payer received from a private military 
contract company for dangerous securjty 
work he performed in Iraq as a private 
contractor was not excludible from gross 
income under the Sec. 112 exclusion for 
compensation paid to U.S. military serv­
ing in a combat zone, because he was a 
civilian.22 However, the taxpayer was not 
liable for penalties for failure to file or pay 
tax. The taxpayer was given a copy of an 
internal IRS memorandum incorrectly 
stating that civilian personnel serving in 
support of combat zone military opera­
tions and physically present in the com­
bat zone could exclude combat pay from 
gross income. The taxpayer relied on the 
memo, and the court determined that he 
therefore had reasonable cause to have 
excluded his wages as combat pay while 
he was in Iraq. The taxpayer was, how­
ever, liable for penalties for failure to .pay 
17 Bakken, T.C. Summ. 2011 -5.5. 20 CCA 201049028 (12/10/10). 

18 Picard, 16.5 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 1999). 21 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, P.L. 111-148. 

19 CCA 201104032 (1/28/11). 22 Holmes, T.C. Memo. 2011-26. 
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estimated taxes, for which no reasonable­
cause exception is generally provided (see 
items on Sec. 6654 below). 
Sec. 117: Qualified 
Scholarships 
The exemption from the payments-for­
service rules for amounts received under 
certain government health professions 
scholarship programs had been scheduled 
to sunset after 2010; however, it was ex­
tended through 2012 by the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthoriza­
tion, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (the 
Tax Relief Act).23 
A series of private letter rulings ad­
dresses exempt organization/private 
foundation procedures for granting schol ­
arships to comply with Sec. 4945(g).24 
Requirements and awar ds granted in ac­
cordance with those procedures will not 
constitute taxable expenditures under Sec. 
4945(d)(3), and awards made under such 
procedures are excludible from recipients' 
gross income under Sec. 1l7(c)(2). 
Sec. 121: Sale of Principal 
Residence 
Use of Sec. 121 to exclude gain from the 
sale of a principal residence by heirs, es­
tates, and qualified revocable trusts is no 
longer applicable. Sec. 121(d)(ll) was re­
pealed for estates of decedents dying and 
transfers made after December 31, 2009.25 




The Code provision under Sec. 127 allow­
ing the exclusion of employer~provided 
educational assistance had been set to 
sunset after 2010 bur has been extended 
through 2012.26 In a field attorney advice, 
the IRS determined that in the case of an 
educational institution that provided tu­
ition assistance to its employees, amounts 
exceeding the $5,250 per year dollar cap 
of Sec. 127 could be deducted as a work­
ing condition fringe benefit, as long as the 
educational assistance otherwise met the 
requirements of Sec. 127 and qualified as 
a working condition fringe benefit under 
Sec. 132.27 
Sec. 135: Income from U.S. 
Savings Bonds Used to Pay 
Higher Education Tuition and 
Fees 
The following Code sections were set 
to expire December 31, 2010, and now 
under the Tax Relief Act will generally 
sunset for tax years beginning after De­
cember 31,2012: Sees. 135(c)(2)(C), (c) 
(4), (d)(1)(D), (d)(2)(A), and (d)(2)(B).2s 
Sec. 162: Trade and Business 
Expenses 
Gambling: The Tax Court overturned 
a key portion of its 1951 decision in Of­
futt2 9 concerning the deductibility of trade 
or business expenses by a professional 
gambler. 30 Under Offutt, ordinary and 
necessary business expenses of a gambling 
activity were treated the same as gambling 
losses and were therefore limited by Sec. 
1.65(d) to gambling winnings. However, 
in Mayo, the court ruled that a profes­
sional gambler may deduct his or her ordi­
nary and necessary business expenses on 
Schedule C even if they exceed the gam­
bler's net gambling winnings and produce 
a loss for the activity. The court noted that 
various rulings had used a narrow defini ­
tion of the phrase "gains from wagering 
transactions" and said a similar reading 
should be used for the phrase "losses from 
wagering transactions" in Sec. 165(d) . 
The court also said it felt it needed to ad­
dress the issue even though the IRS had 
previously announced its intention to no 
longer follow Offutt,3 1 since history in­
vited the possibility of administrative in­
consistency on this issue. 
Substantiating business expenses: 
Sharon Griffin, a resident of Los Angeles, 
filed nine Schedules C with her returns 
for 2001, 2002, and 2003 in addition to 
reporting wage income of over $70,000 
from part-time work.32 Griffin worked 
in the entertainment industry and had 
an assortment of sideline businesses in­
cluding delivery service, computer repair, 
landscaping, steam cleaning, and consult­
ing. Over the three years, these businesses 
had a combined gross income of nearly 
$3 million but reported a net taxable loss 
of over $225,000. Griffin had filed her 
returns late and provided "less than full 
cooperation" during the audit, the court 
said. She regularly failed to show up for 
meetings with an IRS auditor and failed to 
produce promised documents, and those 
she did produce were summaries without 
backup. She claimed that all the expenses 
were paid by cash, and she issued only one 
Form 1099 over the three-year period, 
despite testifying that she paid dozens of 
workers direct cash compensation. The 
Tax Court fo und that her documentation 
"lacked credibility" and her testimony 
was "vague and evasive,'' and it upheld 
the IRS's denial of her deductions. 
In ano ther case, 33 the taxpayer for 
2006 and 2007 reported approx imately 
$335,000 in income and $250,000 in 
business expenses on his Schedule C con­
sulting business for each tax year. The 
IRS audited and asked for substantiation 
of the business expenses. The taxpayer 
refused, claiming a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights. He further argued at 
trial that signing the return under penalty 
of perjury was sufficient substantiation. 
The Tax Court denied all the expenses 
and upheld an accuracy-related penalty of 
$36,113. 
Sec. 170: Charitable 
Contributions and Gifts 
A married couple, both medical doc ­
tors, with three children transferred ap­
preciated stock and cash to a charitable 
23 	 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation i\.ct 
of 2010, P.L. 111 -312. 
24 	 IRS Letter Rulings 201106020 (2/11/1 '1 ), 201104047 (1/28/11), 201104048 
(1/28/11), 201104049 (1/?8/11), 201104050 (1/28/11 ), 201052019 
(12/30/10), 201052020 (12/30110), 201047026 (11126110), 201046017 
(11/19/10), 20'1045032 (11/1211 0), and 201045033 (11/12/10). 
25 Tax Relief Act, §30l(a ). 
26 Tax Relief Act, § 101 (a)(l). 
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27 	 lRS Field Attorney Advice Memo. 201 03901F (1 011/1 0). 
28 	 Tax Relief Act, §101 (a)(l). 
29 	 Offutt, 16 T.C. 1214 (1951). 
30 	 lv!ayo, 136 T.C. 81 (2011 ). 
31 	 IRS Ch ief Counsel Memo. AM 2008-013 (12/19/08). 
32 	 Griffin, T.C. Memo. 2010-252. 
33 	 Raeber, T.C. Memo. 2011-39. 
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foundation "created to benefit not only 
charitab1e causes, but also doctors and 
their families. " 34 The foundation kept the 
donated assets in a separate account for 
each donor and allowed donors to direct 
the use of these funds, specifically includ ­
ing as college loans. The foundation's pro­
gram summary stated that "donors and 
their family members may work for and 
be compensated ... for good works they 
perform on behalf of their family public 
charities" (i.e., the segregated founda ­
tion account). The taxpayers later had the 
foundation make payments to the college 
of one of their sons for tuition and fees. 
The son signed a "loan agreement" prom­
ising to repay the funds 
starting five years after 
graduation or to pro­
vide designated amounts 
of charitable services. The Tax 
Court upheld the IRS's denial of a char­
itable contribution deduction because the 
taxpayers retained control over the stock 
and cash donated to the foundation. The 
court also found the couple liable for 
capital gain tax on the foundation's subse­
quent sale of the appreciated stock and li ­
able for an accuracy-related penalty under 
Sec. 6662. 
Sec. 183: Activities Not 
Engaged in for Profit 
The Tax Court ruled that two cat breed­
ers could not deduct expenses related to 
their cat activities either through a cor­
porate entity or directly as a Schedule 
C business. 15 During the three years in 
question, Debra Dursky and Elizabeth 
Watkins were reimbursed by Dursky's 
corporation (DKD Enterprises) for over 
$60,000 a year in expenses for cat breed­
ing, showing, and upkeep. Total sales dur­
ing the three years combined were less 
than $2,000. The women had engaged in 
similar cat-related activities for at least 10 
years before attempting to deduct the ex­
penses from DKD's income. 
In August 2006, their accountants in­
formed them that the IRS was auditing 
their returns for 2003 and 2004. T hey 
then ceased running the cattery expenses 
through DKD and took no deductions for 
expenses incurred through August on the 
entity's 2006 tax return. DKD's primary 
business had been and remained infor­
mation technology consulting, for which 
Dursky (the sole shareholder) paid herself 
a salary of over $80,000 annually. The 
court agreed with the IRS that the cattery 
activity was clearly a hobby without any 
intent or motive to make a profit. It fur­
ther decided that Dursky must report as 
income the " constructive dividend" she 
received by having DKD reimburse her 
for the cattery-related expenses. 
Sec. 213: Medical Expenses 
The IRS reversed a prior decision 
and announced36 
that payments for 
breast pumps and 
related supplies 
that assist lactation 
qualify as deduct ­
ible medical expenses 
and that reimbursement 
of these costs from medical 
flexible spending accounts, health 
savings accounts, health reimbursement 
arrangements, and Archer medical sav­
ings accounts is not taxable income. 
Sec. 469: Passive Activity 
Losses and Credits Limited 
Real estate election: In two letter r ul­
ings, the taxpayers were determined to 
be in a real property business as defined 
by Sec. 469 and were qualified under Sec. 
469(c)(7)(B) to make an election to treat 
all interests in rental real estate as a single 
rental rea~ estate activity. 37 However, the 
taxpayers failed to include in their tax 
returns the necessary statement under 
Regs. Sec. 1.469-9(g)(3) to make the elec­
tion. The taxpayers requested relief under 
Regs. Sec. 301.9100-3, which aHows an 
.• 
extension to file this election. Based on 
the facts submitted, the taxpayers were 
granted a 60-day extension from the date 
of the rulings to treat all interests in rental 
real estate as a single real estate activity. 
The rulings advised that the election must 
meet the criteria of Regs. Sec. 1.469-9(g) 
(3) and be attached to an amended return. 
Material participation: In a case de ­
cided by the Tax Court, the petitioner ar­
gued that he was a qualifying real estate 
professional because he met the require­
ments of Sec. 469(c)(7)(B) and that his 
rental real estate activities were not pas­
sive because he materially participated in 
them.38 The court disagreed, finding that 
the ta~payer failed to provide requested 
supporting documentation. Also, 
the taxpayer's testimony con­
tradicted his earlier signed 
statements in which he 
said he spent 800 hours 
' 
during the year work­
;, ing on his real estate 
properties. At trial, 
the court explained 
to him that although 
the 800 hours met part 
of the material partici­
pation test-that a tax­
payer must perform more 
than 750 hours during the year 
in real property trades or businesses 
in which the taxpayer materially partici­
pates-they did not meet the additional 
requirement of being more than half of all 
personal services he performed in trades or 
businesses during the year. (The taxpayer 
had previously stated he also worked ap­
proximately 1,800 hours during the year 
as an engineer.) The taxpayer then revised 
his testimony to say he actually spent 
1,920 hours in his real estate business- a 
claim the court judged to lack credibility. 
The taxpayer also was assessed a Sec. 
6662 penalty, which he contended he 
should not be assessed because he used tax 
preparation software. The court said that 
misuse of tax preparation software, even if 
unintentional or accidental, is no defense to 
penalties under Sec. 6662. 
34 Viralam, 136 T.C. 151 (2011 ). 37 IRS Letter Rulings 201108027 (2/25/11) and 201050022 (12/17/10). 
35 DKD Enterprises, T.C. Memo. 2011-29. 38 Anyika, T.C. Memo. 2011-69. 
36 Announcement 2011 -14,2011 -9 I.R.B. 532 (2/28/11). 
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In a similar case,39 the taxpayer could 
not corroborate with \ovritten documenta­
tion his statements that more than one­
half of the personal services he performed 
in trades or businesses during the years 
were performed in real property trades 
or businesses. Further, with respect to 
the 750-hour requirement, the court 
concluded that the petitioner's failure to 
introduce supporting evidence such as 
calendars, narrative summaries, mileage 
logs, or receipts prevented the court from 
accepting his testimony that he worked 
the requisite number of hours. The court 
concluded that the taxpayer was not a 
qualifying real estate professional under 
Sec. 469(c)(7)(B) and treated his real es­
tate activities asperse passive. 
Active participation: In Bosque,40 the 
taxpayer similarly argued that he was a 
real estate professional under Sec. 469(c) 
(7)(B). However, the taxpayer had failed 
to file an election with his 2006 or 2007 
returns to treat all interests in rental real 
estate as a single rental real estate activity 
under Sec. 469(c)(7)(A). The court con­
cluded that the taxpayer failed to show 
that he met the 750-hour service perfor­
mance requirement of Sec. 469(c)(7)(B) 
(ii) for the years at issue. Therefore, the 
court said, he was not a real estate pro­
fessional under Sec. 469(c)(7), and h is 
rental real estate activities must therefore 
be treated as a passive activity under Sec. 
469(c)(2). 
However, Sec. 469(i) provides an ex­
ception to this rule: A taxpayer who ac­
tively participates in a rental activity can 
offset up to $25,000 of losses per year 
against nonpassive income. However, the 
offset amount is subject to phaseout for 
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes 
over $100,000. A taxpayer actively par­
ticipates if he or she does so in a significant 
and bona fide sense in making manage­
ment decisions or arranging for others to 
provide services such as repairs. In Bosque, 
the court held that the taxpayer actively 
participated in his rental real estate ac­
tivities during 2006 and 2007 and conse­
quently '"'as entitled to offset his nonpas­
sive income by $25,000 for each of those 
years, subject to the phaseout limitation. 
Sec. 1001: Determination of 
Amount and Recognition of 
Gain or Loss 
The IRS issued final regulations effective 
January 7, 2011, relating to the modifi­
cation of debt instruments.41 The regula­
tions clarify that a decrease in the Flv1V 
of a debt instrument is nor taken into 
account to determine whether a modi­
fied debt instrument is recharacterized 
as an instrument or property right that is 
not debt, to the extent that the decrease 
in FMV is attributable to the deteriora­
tion in the issuer's financial condition and 
not to a modification of the terms of the 
instrument. 
In a Ta:x Court case/2 the taxpayer's 
basis in regulated investment company 
shares was not increased by undistributed 
regulated investment company gains be­
cause there was no evidence that the un­
distributed gains were ever reported in his 
. 
gross mcome. 
In another case,43 the taxpayer and his 
siblings inherited a house from his mother 
in 2001. In 2004, his siblings conveyed the 
house to him for no consideration; he then 
sold the house in 2004. The Tax Court 
denied his unsubstantiated claim that his 
basis should be increased for mortgage 
payments he made on the inherited prop­
erty. The court determined his basis to be 
the FMV on his mother's date of death. 
The Tax Court saw more litigation in 
2011 arising from purported stock loans 
marketed to small investors bv Derivium 
' 
Capital LLC.44 In one case,45 the court de~ 
termined that a taxpayer's 90% Derivium 
stock-loan program was a sale in the year 
the stock was transferred to the purported 
lender, not the year the purported loans 
matured. 
In another Derivium case,46 the tax­
payer, president, and owner of a manu­
facturing company sold shares of his 
stock to the company's employee stock 
ownership plan (ESOP) in 1999. He 
properly deferred gain on the sale by 
purchasing qualified floating rate notes 
(FRNs) from Bank of America. In 2004, 
Der1v1um aff1hate Optech Ltd. marketed 
an ESOP-qualified replacement property 
90% loan-to-value program to the tax­
payer. The nonrecourse loan was secured 
by the FRNs. Optech agreed to serve 
as the lender or as an agent for another 
lender. The agreement provided that the 
lender had the right to register the FRNs 
in its own name and could do as it wished 
with them. The taxpayer also waived his 
right to receive interest or other benefits 
from the FRNs during the term of the 
loan, and he could not repay the loan. 
Since the taxpayer transferred the inci­
dents of ownership to the lender and had 
no obligation to repay the loan, there was 
no bona fide debtor-creditor relation­
ship, the Tax Court held. The court found 
that a sale of the shares occurred in 2004 
when the taxpayer transferred the FRNs 
to Optech. 
Sec. 1012: Basis of Property: 
Cost 
Husband and wife taxpayers donated a 
qualified conservation easement on about 
54 acres of their Colorado property to a 
charitable organizationY In exchange, 
they received about $260,000 of conser­
vation easement income tax credits from 
the state of Colorado. Later in 2004, they 
sold some of the credits and claimed as 
basis in the easements a portion of the 
professional fees incurred to make the 
donation. The Tax Court held that they 
improperly allocated costs associated 
with the donation and had no basis in the 
state credits. Although the credits were 
determined to be capital assets, their sale 
was determined to result in a short-term 
capital gain because the holding period of 
the underlying donated land could not be 
attributed to the state credits. 
39 Magno, T.C. Summ. 2011 -43. ported stock loans that the IRS and courts have generally held to have been 

40 Bosque, T.C. Memo. 2011-79. taxable sales. See, e.g., Calloway, 135 T.C. 26 (2010), and Shao, T.C. Memo. 

41 T.D. 9513. 2010-189. 

42 Knowles, T.C. Memo. 2011 -23. 45 I<urata, T.C. Memo. 2011-64 . 

43 Jarman, T.C. Memo. 2010-285. 46 Sol/berger, T.C. Memo. 2011-78. 

44 Betlveen 1998 and 2002, the company engaged in approximately 1,700 pur- 47 Tempel, 136 T.C. 341 (2011). 
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Sec. 1031: Like-Kind Exchange 

The Tax Court held48 that taxpayers had 
to recognize income from a failed attempt 
to complete a like-kind exchange. Money 
from a sale of their property had not been 
deposited with a qualified intermediary. 
Although the funds were deposited into 
an escrow account, the taxpayers' con­
trol over the money was not subject to 
substantial limitations or restrictions, so 
the Tax Court held that the account was 
not a qualified escrow account for like­
kind exchange purposes. Therefore, the 
Tax Court agreed with the IRS that the 
taxpayers had constructively received the 
proceeds from the sale. 
The Office of Chief Counsel released 
a letter49 stating that the IRS had no au ­
thority to allow nonrecognition of "flash 
crash" gains resulting from May 6, 2010, 
security sales that automatically were ex­
ecuted due to stop-loss orders. The stock 
market had a temporary but severe drop, 
apparently due to an erroneously entered 
trade. The large stock market plunge 
caused many investors to have automatic, 
unexpected security sales. Security sales do 
not qualify for nonrecognition under Sec. 
1031, so an investor could not rely on the 
provision to defer the gain realized on the 
securities sold. 
Sec. 1041: Transfers of Property 
Incident to Divorce 
A divorced taxpayer could not use the 
FMV of real property at the time of trans­
fer from her former spouse as the proper­
ty's basis in computing gain or loss.5° The 
Tax Court held that the property's basis 
for this purpose was the former spouse's 
adjusted basis in the property. 
Sec. 1250: Gain from 
Dispositions of Certain 
Depreciable Realty 
A married couple who owned restaurant 
franchise businesses was not required to 
recognize any recapture income under 
Sec. 1250 on the sale of a franchise in 
one year at issue.51 The IRS incorrectly 
assumed that the franchise's property was 
composed of only Sec. 1250 property, and 
there was no evidence that the taxpayers 
used anything other than the straight-line 
method when depreciating their busi­
ness's Sec. 1250 property, the Tax Court 
held. The taxpayers also had no recap­
ture income under Sec. 1245 for property 
improvements made during that year be­
cause the IRS neither argued nor deter­
mined that any part of their deficiency 
stemmed from Sec. 1245 recapture. 




The Social Security contribution and ben­
efit base for remuneration paid in 2011 
and for self-employment income earned in 
tax years beginning in 2011 is $106,800, 
unchanged from 2010. 
The Tax Relief Act enacted a one-year 
tax break in 2011 to provide an economic 
stimulus by increasing workers' take­
home pay. Congress approved a reduction 
of 2 percentage points in Social Security 
payroll taxes for employees and self-em­
ployment tax. Thus, the Social Security 
payroll tax rate for 2011 is 4.2% for em­
ployees and 10.4% for the self-employed. 
In a chief counsel advice,S2 the IRS 
noted that nonresident aliens generally do 
not owe self-employment tax, but if they 
are subject to the tax, a totalization agree­
ment is necessary. In both it and another 
chief counsel advice, 53 the lRS advised that 
the provision for the Self-Employment 
Contributions Act tax under a totalization 
agreement is found in Sec. 1402(b). 
LLC members and limited partners: 
The Tax Court disregarded a limited li­
ability company (LLC) and management 
corporation54 created by a psychiatrist 
to reduce his tax liability, holding that 
net income arising from his practice was 
taxable as self-employment income. The 
court also found the taxpayer liable for 
accuracy-related penalties, saying his re ­
liance on a tax adviser who had recom­
mended the strategy was not reasonable 
or prudent. 
The Tax Court's opinion in Renke­
meyer55 increased uncertainty about 
whether partners ·in a limited liability entity 
are subject to self-employment tax. The 
case addressed Sec. 1402(a)( 13), which in 
general provides that the income of a lim­
ited partner is not subject to self-employ­
ment tax as long as it is not a guaranteed 
payment for services rendered. However, 
the Code does not define "limited partner." 
Members of limited liability companies 
and partners in limited liability partner­
ships (LLh) have relied on this section to 
exempt their share of income from self­
employment tax. In Renkemeyer, the at ­
torneys in a law firm organized as an LLP 
argued that their interests should be con­
sidered those of limited partners because 
the interests were designated as such in 
the organizational documents. This was 
despite the fact that 99% of the firm's net 
income was generated by legal services per­
formed by the three partners of the firm. 
Proposed regulations issued in 1997 
would deny limited partner status for pur­
poses of the Sec. 1402(a)( 13) exemption 
from self-employment tax (with some ex­
ceptions) to any individual partner who 
participates in the partnership's trade or 
business for more than 500 hours a year, 
is able to contract on behalf of the partner­
ship, or has personal liability for the part ­
nership's debts.56 In response to criticism 
of the proposed regulations, Congress 
issued a one-year moratorium stripping 
Treasury of its authority to issue tempo­
rary or final guidance on the definition 
of limited partner under this section. Al ­
though the moratorium expired on July 1, 
1998, the IRS and Treasury have not final ­
ized, withdrawn, or replaced the proposed 
regulations. The opinion in Renkemeyer 
effectively adopted the principle of the 
proposed regulations. The court held that 
LLP income allocated to the partners was 
subject to self-employment tax and that 
Congress had not intended for partners 
who perform services for a partnership 
in that capacity to qualify for the limited 
partner exdusion. 
48 Crandall, T.C. Summ. 2011-14. 53 CCA 201109027 (3/4111). 

49 INFO 2010-0188 (9/24/1 0). Letter from john Aramburu, IRS senior counsel. 54 Robucci, T.C. Memo. 2011 -1 9. 

50 Parsley, T.C. Summ. 20'11-35. 55 Renkemeyer, Campbell c.~ Weaver LLP, 136 T.C. 137 (2011). 

51 Daoud, T.C. Memo. 2010-2132 . 56 REG-209824-96. They replaced earlier proposed regu lations the IRS with ­

.'i2 CCA 201101010 (117111}. d rew (REG-209729-94). 
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Health insurance premiums: For 2011, 
self-employed taxpayers can no longer de­
duct their health insurance premiums as 
a business expense from net earnings for 
purposes of self-employment taxY For 
2010 only, eligible self-employed individ­
uals were able to deduct health insurance 
premiums for months in which they were 
ineligible to participate in any subsidized 
health plan offered by an employer or a 
spouse's employer. However, on March 2, 
2011, a bill was introduced that would re­
store the deduction permanently. 58 
Sec. 6013: Joint Returns 
In a chief counsel advices9 the Office of 
Chief Counsel directed that a taxpayer for 
whom the IRS had filed a substitute return 
under Sec. 6020(b) and issued a notice of 
deficiency could elect joint filing status 
under Sec. 6013(a) with a spouse who 
had died during the year. The Chief Coun­
sel's Office cited the Tax Court holding in 
Millsap60 that the return prepared under 
Sec. 6020(b) did not constitute a separate 
return filed by the taxpayer. Assuming 
that no return had been filed by the dece­
dent or an executor or administrator, no 
executor or administrator had been ap­
pointed, and no executor or administrator 
would be appointed before the last day 
prescribed by law for filing the return of 
the surviving spouse, the taxpayer was eli­
gible to file a joint return. 
Same-sex couples: The issue of same­
sex couples filing joint returns may soon 
be in the forefront of tax changes. On 
February 23, 2011, U.S. Attorney General 
Eric Holder indicated that the Department 
of Justice will no longer defend the consti­
tutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) 61 in two Second 
Circuit cases.62 Section 3 defines "mar­
riage" under federal law as between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife 
and defines "spouse" as a person of the 
opposite sex. Both Holder and President 
Barack Obama have stated that Section 3 
of DOMA is unconstitutional as applied 
to same-sex couples legally married under 
state law. In spite of this, the IRS must con­
tinue to follow DOMA when applying the 
provisions in the Code or regulations. A 
number of practitioners are advising same­
sex couples married under applicable state 
law to file single or head-of-household 
returns for now but to keep in mind that 
a federal law change could allow them to 
later file joint amended returns. 
Sec. 6015: Innocent Spouse 
Relief 
Despite favorable opinions in several cir­
cuit courts for its stance limiting the filing 
period for claims for equitable innocent 
spouse relief to two years, the IRS aban­
doned the position,63 saying it will now 
consider taxpayer requests for equitable 
relief from joint and several liability under 
Sec. 6015(f) at any time if the limitation 
period for collection of taxes under Sec. 
6502 remains open for the tax years at 
issue (generally, 10 years after an assess­
ment). If the taxpayer is seeking a refund 
as part of the request, the limitation pe­
riod on credits or refunds under Sec. 6511 
governs (generally, three years). Until 
the regulations are revised and the limit 
is formally removed, the IRS provided 
transitional rules for requesting relief or 
resolving cases currently in litigation. The 
change of position was not wholly unex­
pected; the IRS had been mulling revising 
the limit in Regs. Sec. 1.6015-5(b)(1) at 
least since April2011, when 49 members 
of Congress in a letter urged IRS Commis­
sioner Douglas Shulman to do so. 
Despite its having been reversed on the 
issue by the Third, Fourth, and Seventh cir­
cuits,64 the Tax Court had continued to hold 
the regulation invalid.65 The court had con­
cluded that, because Congress specifically 
omitted any limitation period from Sec. 
6015(f), and because that subsection pro­
vides relief that cannot be obtained under 
Sec. 6015(b) or Sec. 6015(c), Congress in­
tended that the two-year limitation would 
not apply in connection with Sec. 6015(f). 
The appeals courts generally found 
that Congress had granted the IRS the 
authority to devise appropriate substan­
tive and relevant procedures to be fol­
lowed, including deadlines, and that the 
two-year limitation period was a reason­
able exercise of that authority. 
Sec. 6654: Estimated Tax 
Payments 
Unearned income MediCl.lre tax: As 
provided by the Health Care and Educa­
tion Reconciliation Act of 2010,66 indi ­
viduals, estates, and trusts will be subject 
to an unearned income Ivledicare contri ­
bution tax for tax years beginning after 
December 31, 2012. The tax on individu­
als is 3.8% of the lesser of net investment 
income or the excess of modified adjusted 
gross income over a threshold amountY 
The tax imposed on a trust or estate is 
3.8% of the lesser of undistributed net in ­
vestment income or the excess of adjusted 
gross income over the dollar amount at 
which the highest applicable income tax 
bracket begins ($11,351 in 2011). This 
tax is subject to the estimated tax provi­
sions under Sec. 6654 and is not deduct­
ible in computing income tax. 
Court cases: An individual receiving 
pension benefits claimed that the payments 
were tax-free disability income.68 Accord­
ingly, the taxpayer did not file tax returns 
for the years in question and did not make 
estimated tax payments. The IRS prepared 
a substitute for return for each tax year. The 
taxpayer never submitted substantiation to 
refute the substitutes for return. Noting that 
the Sec. 6654 addition to tax is mandatory 
and provides for no reasonable cause excep­
tion, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer 
was liable for an addition to tax because of 
his failure to pay his estimated taxes. 
57 Sec. 162(1)(4 ), as amended by §2042 of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, 
P.L. 110-240. Premiums remain deductible for income tax purposes. 
58 Equity for Our Nation's Self-Employed Act of 2011, H.R. 880. 
59 CCA 201049030 (12/10/10). 
60 Millsap , 91 T.C. 926 (1998), acq., AOD-1992-03. 
61 Defense of Marriage Act, P.L. 104-199. 
62 Pedersen v. Office of Pe-rsonnel Management, No. 10-CV-1750 (D. Conn.), 
and Windso-r, No. 10-CV-8435 (S.D.N.Y.). 
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63 Notice 2011-70,2011-32 I.R.B. 135. 

64 Lantz, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010); Mannella, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011}; 

Jones, 642 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 6/13/11). 
65 See, e.g., Pullins, 136 T.C. No. 20 (2011) . 
66 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, P.L. 111-152. 
67 Sec. 1411. 
68 Lukovsky, T.C. Memo. 2010-117. 
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In another case,69 an individual did not 
timely file tax returns for three consecu­
tive years during which he also made no 
estimated tax payments. The IRS prepared 
substitute tax returns that included pension 
income ranging from $95,000 to $150,000. 
In response to the IRS notices, the taxpayer 
submitted tax returns for the same years 
with zeros on every line requiring a dollar 
amount, except those for the standard de­
duction and personal exemption. The court 
found that the IRS did not provide proof of 
an estimated tax payment requirement for 
the first year in question, since there was 
no return on file for the prior year and thus 
no evidence of a prior-year tax liability. Be­
cause the IRS bears the burden of proof for 
a dditions to tax under Sec. 6654, the Tax 
Court held that the taxpayer was not liable 
for a Sec. 6654 penalty for the first year but 
was liable for penalties assessed in the fol­
lowing two years. 
In yet another case, a taxpayer who 
fa iled t o make estim a ted tax payments 
claimed legal, emotional, and physical dis­
tress caused by events involving her former 
husband, who was sen tenced to prison for 
various criminal activities .70 Generally, no 
reasonable cause exception exists for the 
Sec. 6654 addition to tax. However, the 
IRS may waive it if the taxpayer became 
disabled in the tax year for which estimated 
tax payments were required or in the pre­
ceding tax year and the underpayment 
was due to reasonable cause and not will­
ful neglect. Or the penalty may be waived 
because o f disaster, casualty, or "other 
unusual circumsta nces, wl!ere its impo­
sition would be against equity and good 
conscience .71 However, the taxpayer did 
not provide sufficient evidence to support 
either of these exceptions, the court held. 
In another case,72 an individual claim-ed 
zero wages on returns and an amended re­
turn covering three tax years, despite receiv­
i.ng Forms W-2 showing wages of $78,267, 
$82,553, and $68,364. H e claimed the 
wages were not taxable income. The IRS 
notified the taxpayer that it considered the 
returns frivo lo us, but the taxpayer con­
tinued to argue t hey were valid. The Tax 
Court held that his submissions did not sat­
isfy the four-part test established in Beard73 
for a valid return, since they did not contain 
sufficient data to allow the IRS to calculate 
his liability and "did not represent an hon­
est and reasonable attempt to satisfy the 
requirements of the tax law.,, Penalties for 
failure to file and pay estimated taxes were 
deemed to have been conceded by the tax­
payer because he did not address them in 
his petitions or at trial. 
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